This paper considers whether the disadvantages that accrue to black Americans with a dark skin hue also induce a transition into criminal activity-an outcome consistent with standard economic models of crime. We also examine whether or not prison terms are conditioned on skin hue. With data on black offenders in the state of Mississippi, we estimate Cox proportional hazard specifications of the transition into criminal activity, and find that it is conditioned on the darkness of skin hue. Our parameter estimates are consistent with a theoretical framework in which being black and having a dark skin hue induces a transition into criminal activity by limiting the set of legitimate opportunities for an individual. Given a conviction, we also find that the severity of punishment for black offenders as measured by the length of sentence is an increasing function of the darkness of skin hue.
Conditional on being black there is evidence that skin hue matters for a wide array of socioeconomic outcomes. For example, relative to blacks with a light skin hue, there is evidence that blacks with a dark skin hue fare worse in terms of wages (Goldsmith, Hamilton and Darity, 2005) , occupational prestige (Hill, 2000) , unemployment ( Hunter, Allen and Telles, 2001 ), access to health resources (Bodenhorn, 2002) , and intergenerational wealth accumulation (Bodenhorn, 2003) . Such findings suggest that the distribution of advantage and disadvantage in American life is conditioned not just on being black, but given that one is black, skin hue as well.
That skin hue conditions economic outcomes for blacks suggests that profit maximizing firms and utility maximizing individuals optimize across a preference for blacks with light skin hues (Goldsmith, Hamilton and Darity, 2005) . If so, the distribution of disadvantage among blacks will fall along a continuum of gradations in skin hue, with disadvantage increasing with respect to the darkness of skin hue. One possible manifestation of disadvantage is crime. In the canonical economic model of crime of Becker (1968) and as extended by Ehrlich (1973) , disadvantaged individuals can be viewed as those with constrained opportunities for engaging in legitimate activities, relative to illegitimate activities. To the extent that conditional on being black, opportunities for engaging in legitimate activities are inversely proportional to the darkness of skin hue, the probability of participating in illegitimate activities-crime-may also be conditioned on skin hue.
Despite the apparent importance of skin hue in the distribution of advantage and disadvantage, the economics of crime literature tends to view blacks as one homogeneous group.
1 To the extent that skin hue matters, aggregating across black Americans in this manner could lead to biased estimates of the effects of being black on participation in criminal activity, and to inferences that being black is associated with higher stocks of "criminal capital" relative to non-blacks. However, given that race and skin hue determine the distribution of disadvantage among black Americans, the effects of being black on criminal activity may instead reflect the disadvantages that accrue to being black conditional on skin hue.
In this paper we consider the effects of skin hue both on the likelihood of participation in criminal activities, and on sentencing for black Americans conditional on being convicted for crime. To the extent that individuals, firms and social institutions optimize across preferences for blacks with a light skin hue, it is plausible that blacks with a dark skin hue face, relative to those with a light skin hue, constraints on opportunities for legitimate activities that motivate illegitimate activities and once arrested, are punished more severely than black offenders with a light skin hue.
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1 See for example Ehrlich (1973) and Gyimah-Brempong (1997) . 2 The only evidence that we are aware of that links skin hue among blacks with criminal justice issues is that provided by Johnson, Farrell and Stoloff (2000) . They found that among black men with prior criminal records in Los Angeles, the jobless rate for those with a dark skin hue was 54 percent-in contrast to 41.7 for those with a light skin hue.
I. Theory, Empirical Approach and Data
We adopt a continuous-time hazard approach to participation in criminal activity, where it is posited that individuals over their lives are presented with opportunities for criminal activity, and engage in it if it is in their best interest. In particular we modify and extend the labor market search-theoretic hazard framework of Kiefer (1988) to answer the following question: given that a black American is engaged in or searching for legitimate activities at age t, what impact does skin hue have on the probability of a transition to criminal activities? The individual's transition from legitimate activities-whether actually engaged in or being searched for-can be viewed as a hazard that consists of the product of two probabilities or λ(t) = ηπ, where η is the probability that an individual faces an opportunity for crime, and π is the probability that the opportunity for crime is acceptable.
The potential significance of skin hue enters through a plausible specification of the condition under which a crime opportunity is acceptable to an individual. To the extent that for blacks, the availability of legitimate activities are decreasing with respect to increases in the darkness of skin hue, a sensible specification for the probability that a crime opportunity is acceptable is π = ∞ y * (φ) f (y)dy, where f (y) is the probability of earning y from criminal activity, φ is a monotonic continuous measure of the darkness of an individual's skin hue, and y * (φ) is an individual's reservation level of earnings from crime-the minimum level of earnings from crime at which he would engage in criminal activity.
If conditional on being black, legitimate opportunities are decreasing with respect to the darkness of skin hue, the reservation level of earnings from crime could also decrease as a result of dark skin hue reducing possibilities for legitimate activities. As ∂y * (φ)/∂φ < 0, the earnings from criminal activity are more likely to exceed the reservation earnings from criminal activity for blacks with a dark skin hue-which increases the crime hazard.
Empirically, the significance of skin hue for explaining the transition to criminal activity can be determined in a proportional hazards framework where the crime hazard is a function of some baseline hazard common to all individuals and explanatory variables:
where λ(o) is a baseline crime hazard, and β k measures the impact of explanatory variable X k on the transition to criminal activity. 3 We examine the effects of skin hue on the crime hazard and prison sentence with data-available upon request from the authors-on black offenders with last name starting with the letter "A" incarcerated in the state of Mississippi as of August 20, 2005 . Table 1 provides definitions and summary statistics on constructed variables for the 403 observations we were able to obtain. The major variables of interest are several measures of skin hue across two broad classifications (TONE1-TONE6, and COLOR1-COLOR3). Other variables of interest are the age at which the offender was convicted for the current crime-which measures the duration of an offender's time engaged in or pursuing legitimate activities, the length of his prison term.
Other variables, incorporated as controls, include those that measure the type of crime convicted for, gender, and two measures designed to capture socioeconomic factors that may condition the transition into criminal activity: the scrabble value of an offender's first name, and the ratio of median to mean income in the county where the offender was convicted.
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There are potentially many factors for black offenders that matter for the transition into criminal activity that our data simply do not and/or cannot measure. The omission of variablesbeyond those included as controls-measuring these factors in a crime hazard specification introduces an omitted variable bias to parameter estimates. 5 We control for these possible biases by estimating the parameters of the crime hazard specification within an unobserved frailty framework.
Frailty is an unobservable and random risk factor-heterogeneous across different groups-that modifies the hazard function of individuals, and conditions the parameter estimates on the unobserved frailty/heterogeneity. 6 For j = 1 . . . J groups of individuals, let the unobserved Gamma-distributed random frailty be α j , then for a vector of explanatory variables X, a Cox proportional hazard specification with unobserved frailty/heterogeneity is:
where, E(α j ) = 1, V ar(α j ) = θ, and ν j = log α j .
If there is fairness in punishment for crime, then conditional on a conviction, the sentencing for blacks should not be a function of skin hue. If on the other hand penal institutions also optimize across preferences for blacks with a light skin hue, blacks with a dark skin hue could receive more 4 Figlio (2005) shows that individuals with low socioeconomic status have a tendency to have first names with a high scrabble value. Gloom (2004) argues that the ratio of median to mean income is a good approximation of the extent of income equality.
5 We don't have for example, any data on human capital for each offender-which is important in standard economic models of crime where the probability of participating in crime is decreasing in individual human capital stocks.
Our unobserved/frailty framework preserves this feature of economic models of crime by allowing for unobserved heterogeneity in individual human capital stocks, and by conditioning on the darkness of skin hue which also seems to matter for the acquisition of human capital (Hill, 2000) .
severe punishment relative to blacks with a light skin hue. We use length of sentence data from our sample to test whether, given conviction for a similar offense, blacks with a dark skin hue receive more punishment relative to blacks with a light skin hue.
II. The Effects of Skin Hue on Crime and Punishment
Does being black and having a dark skin hue actually engender disadvantage that induces a transition into criminal activity? Table 2 reports parameter estimates of equation (1) across 6 specifications on two classifications of skin hue, with a baseline standard Cox specification (columns 1, 4), and with frailty defined over an individual's membership in one of 7 skin hue categories, and the year he was jailed (columns 2, 5), and year he was born (columns 3, 6). 7 The dependent variable for all specifications is the age at which the offender was incarcerated-which we assume measures the duration of time spent engaged in or searching for legitimate non-criminal opportunities.
For both categorizations of skin hue, the effects of having a dark skin hue on the crime hazard are positive but insignificant for the basic Cox specification (columns 1, 4), and when frailty is defined over year-jailed/skin hue groupings (columns 2, 5). Skin hue has a positive and significant effect on the crime hazard when the frailty and unobserved heterogeneity is defined over year-born/skin hue groupings (columns 3, 6). For the six skin hue classification schemes in column 3, all but the light brown skin hue is significant, suggesting that being black and having a skin hue that is at least medium or medium brown is associated with a disadvantage that induces a transition into criminal activity. The results in column 6 suggest that relative to blacks that have a fair or light skin hue, blacks with a darker skin hue face disadvantages that induce a transition into criminal activity. In both cases, the model diagnostics are supportive of the Cox specifications with unobserved frailty/heterogeneity and year-born/skin hue groupings. 8 Our results suggest the need to account for differences in skin hue when estimating the effects of race on crime.
That the darkness of skin hue matters for the transition into criminal activity suggests that darkhued blacks face disadvantages in obtaining legitimate opportunities which drives them to criminal activities. This raises the possibility that given a conviction for an offense, relative to blacks with a 7 All coefficients are reported in unexponentiated form, and measure the impact a particular variable has on the crime hazard-or the age-specific probability of making a transition into criminal activity. The frailty groupings are motivated by evidence that the significance and effects of skin hue among blacks may be sensitive to time-particularly the year in which an individual is born (Hughes and Hertel, 1990 light skin hue, blacks with a dark skin hue receive different treatment in sentencing. In Table 3 , we report the results of Ordinary Least Squares regression, where the dependent variable is the log of the sentence-in years received. We control for the type of crime convicted for, and to approximate the Cox unobserved frailty/heterogeneity regressions in Table 2 , we cluster the standard errors on the relevant frailty groupings, and add as a regressor in four of the specifications, an estimate of the baseline cumulative hazard for each individual from the relevant specification in Table 2 . 9 For all six specifications, and with the exception of having a light brown skin hue, a dark skin hue has a large positive, and significant effect on an individual offender's prison sentence. It is instructive to note that the magnitudes of the coefficients of the various shades of skin hue are much larger than those of the type of crime for which blacks were convicted. Apparently, convicted black offenders with a dark skin hue face discriminatory treatment in sentencing, as the prison sentence increases with the darkness of skin hue.
III. Conclusions
This paper considered whether or not the disadvantages that accrue to dark skin hue also induce a transition into criminal activity-an outcome consistent with standard economic models of crime. We also examined whether or not prison terms are conditioned by the skin hue of black convicted offenders. Our results, show that crime and punishment for black Americans-at least in
Mississippi-are a function of skin hue. Having a dark skin hue, all things equal, induces a transition into criminal activity-presumably as a result of dark skin hue constraining the set of legitimate non-criminal activities. In our theoretical framework, being black and having a dark skin hue induces a transition into criminal activity by increasing π-the probability that an opportunity for criminal activity is acceptable-as having a dark skin hue decreases the reservation level of income from criminal activity. Being black and having a dark skin hue is also associated with longer prison sentence-suggesting that punishment for crime is an increasing function of the darkness of skin hue for black Americans.
9 The baseline cumulative hazard measures the total amount of crime risk up to the time of entry into criminal activity for an individual. As in Kiefer (1988) it is measured as Λ(o) = λ(o)dt, and is retrievable in STATA 8.0 NOTES: For the sub-categories that constitute the broad skin hue categories of COLOR and TONE, the percentages don't add up to one due to rounding. In the case of the crime categories, there is some overlap between categories from some inmates (e.g., one could be serving time for both drug and violent crime), so the sum of the crime categories across the sample is not constrained to be unity. The null hypothesis is that the residuals from the Cox specification are identical to residuals generated from a nonparametric Nelson-Aalen density. 
